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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
parently, the court will not categorically presume that the parties
intended either the law of the place of the execution of the con-
tract or of the place of the employment to govern their contract; 38
but it will take into consideration all of the various factors as
tending to show the intent of the parties. The applicability of
the act to any particular case will depend upon its peculiar facts.
The place of the contract, the place of the enployment and the
place of the industry of the employer will still be of prime im-
portance. The place of the injury and the residence of the parties,
although of comparatively slight importance, will also be con-
sidered.
An additional procedural point in the decision is worthy of
mention. The Louisiana court accepted the prevailing view in
overruling the pleas of res judicata and estoppel. Proceedings
may be brought in a state under its applicable Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, although the act of another state also is applica-
ble.39 The fact that an award was made under the act of another
state does not bar a subsequent proceedings, but a credit is al-
lowed for the amount already received. 40 In this case credit was
voluntarily given.
J. C. W.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RIGHT OF PERSONS NOT DEPEND-
ENT TO RECOVER IN TORT-An employee was injured while in the
course of employment, and died thirteen hours later as a result
of having been burned and scalded by steam and hot water em-
anating from a defective stationary engine. Plaintiffs, a brother
and sister, not dependents, but sole heirs of their brother, brought
this action to recover damages ex delicto under Article 2315 of the
Civil Code. The court held for the defendants saying that a con-
tract of employment to do hazardous work is governed exclu-
case with reference to the nature of the work to be done, the place of per-
formance, the domicile of the parties, etc.-all with a view of discovering the
true intent of the parties." Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 10 So. (2d)
109, 112 (La. App. 1942): "and his proven intention not to reside permanently
in the State of Texas where the last job was to be performed."
38. In contracts generally, the majority of the courts of the United
States, while also seeking the intention of the parties, indulge in presump-
tions as to the place intended. It is usually presumed that the place of
performance is intended. Cf. Stumberg, Principles of Conflicts of Laws
(1937) 209.
39. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 6f Conflict of Laws
(1934) 489, § 402.
40. Id. at 489, § 403.
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sively by the provisions of the compensation law, not only with
respect to the right and remedy of the employee himself, but as
to all persons designated by Article 2315 of the Civil Code as
having a right of action to recover for death by wrongful act.
Atchison v. May, 10 So. (2d) 785 (La. 1942).
The question of the right of persons not entitled to compen-
sation under Workmen's Compensation Acts to sue in tort for
the wrongful death of a relative has given occasion for little ac-
tive consideration by the courts. The instant case is the first to
reach the Louisiana Supreme Court on this issue, and it raises
two problems-one of statutory interpretation, the other a social
problem which lies at the root of such legislation. Article 2315
of the Civil Code' provides:
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another,
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it; the right
of this action shall survive in case of death in favor of the
children, including adopted children, or spouse of the deceased,
or either of them, and in default of these, in favor of the sur-
viving father and mother or either of them, and in default of
any of the above persons, then in favor of the surviving bro-
thers and sisters, or either of them. .. ."
The Louisiana Employers' Liability Act 2 provides:
"The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or
his dependent on account of a personal injury for which he is
entitled to compensation under this act shall be exclusive of
all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representatives, dependents, relations, or otherwise, on account
of such injury."
The crux of the problem in the instant case apparently turns on
the interpretation of this section of the Employers' Liability Act.
Justice McCaleb, in presenting the opinion of the court, sub-
mitted the cases of Philps v. Guy Drilling Company' and Colo-
rado v. Johnson Iron Works4 as authority for holding that a con-
tract of employment to do hazardous work is governed exclu-
1. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870, as last amended by Act 159 of 1932, § 1.
2. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 34, as last amended by La. Act 38 of 1918 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4423]. See also La. Act 20 of 1914, § 3, as amended by Act 85
of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4393].
3. 143 La. 951, 79 So. 549 (1918).
4. 146 La. 68, 83 So. 381 (1919).
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sively by the provisions of the compensation law, not only with
respect to the right and remedy of the employee himself, but as
to all persons designated as beneficiaries by Article 2315 of the
Civil Code having-a right or cause of action to recover for death
by wrongful act. But it must be noted that in these cases the
plaintiffs were entitled to compensation under the compensation
act as dependents. It was maintained by the defense that a differ-
ent result should be reached in a case like the instant one where
the petition shows on its face that the deceased left no dependents
at all.5 However, it is further pointed out in the opinion that in
Williams v. Blodgett Construction Company," reviewing the con-
stitutionality of Section 34 of the Employers' Liability Act, the
court held that the rights and remedies provided in that act were
exclusive, and brothers and sisters of the deceased were not al-
lowed to maintain an action under Article 2315 of the Civil Code,
notwithstanding the plaintiff's allegation that there were no de-
pendents entitled to compensation under the act.
A number of jurisdictions have denied the personal represen-
tative of a deceased employee this right declaring that the pro-
vision of the compensation act stating that the rights and reme-
dies granted to an employee on account of personal injury or
death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of
such employee, his personal representative, dependents, or next
of kin at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or
death.7 In conformity with this rule the Florida Supreme Court
denied an action in tort to personal representatives notwithstand-
ing that the employee left no dependents to take compensation
under the act.8 These decisions might be vindicated by the posi-
tive wording of the statutes, which apparently manifest the legis-
lature's intention to substitute the compensation act in the place
5. Atchison v. May, 10 So.(2d) 785, 788 (La. 1942).
6. 146 La. 841, 84 So. 115 (1920).
7. McDonald v. Miner,'218 Ind. 373, 32 N.E.(2d) 885 (1941); Shanahan v.
Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N.Y. 469, 114 N.E. 795 (1916); Liberato v.
Royer, 281 Pa. 227, 126 Atl. 257 (1924), affirmed 270 U.S. 535, 46 S.Ct. 373, 70
LEd. 719 (1926). If the defendant could have established the requisite employ-
ment he would have prevailed, for the Workmen's Compensation Act fur-
nishes the exclusive method of securing compensation for an injury, and the
action for wrongful death will not lie. Vescio v. Pa. Electric Co., 336 Pa. 502,
9 Atl.(2d) 546 (1939). If claimant could have recovered under the Employers'
Liability Act for death of deceased, she would have had no cause of action
under Article 2315 of the Civil Code. Dandridge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York, 192 So. 887 (La. App. 1939).
8. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corporation, 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486
(1940).
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of all other liability." The present case, in harmony with this
view, was decided under a similar statute.10
On the other hand, there is authority for holding the opposite.
Awarding damages to a widow on behalf of herself and eight
children, only three of whom were dependents within the mean-
ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Minnesota Supreme
Court declared that the wrongful death act is not amended or
supplemented so as to effect the rights of the next of kin who
are not dependents under the compensation act.1 ' This view might
find support in the numerous decisions, purporting to construe
the purpose of such legislation, which explain that the Work-
men's Compensation Acts were designed primarily to improve
the fortune of the workman and his family,1 2 and not to assure
the employer of immunity from any liability.
In the present decision the court, without' reserve, labels the
Employers' Liability Act "social legislation" and presumably jus-
tifies their interpretation of the act by social policy. A review
of the Louisiana decisions in the matter of the compensation act
reveals the court's theory that the purpose of the act is primarily
to lift the burden of industrial accidents from the injured work-
man and place it on industry. 3 The act provides a quicker and
more positive remedy to a certain group of persons, and at the
9. Fla. Acts 1935, c. 17481, § 11, Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (Skillman,
Supp. 1936) § 5966(11) provides "The liability of the employer ... shall be
exclusive and in the place of all other liability .. .;" Minn. Stats. 1937, c. 64,
§ 3, Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 4272-3 uses the same proviso; Ind. Acts
1929, c. 172, § 6, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1206 provides "The rights
and remedies herein granted to an employee . . . shall exclude all other
rights .. .;" Pa. Acts 1915, No. 338, p. 736, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit.
77, § 673 provides "such agreement . . . shall operate as a surrender by the
parties thereto of their rights ... other than as provided in ... this act."
10. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 34, as last amended by La. Act 38 of 1918 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4423] provides "The rights and remedies herein granted ...
shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies . . ." Id. at § 3 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4393] provides "Such an agreement shall be a surrender by the
parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form, or amount of com-
pensation or determination thereof than as provided in this act, and shall
bind the employee himself, his widow and relations, and dependents as here-
inafter defined."
11. Joel v. Peter Dale Garage, 206 Minn. 580, 289 N.W. 524 (1940).
12. Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41 F.(2d) 593 (C.C.A. 4th,
1930); Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F.(2d) 781, 94 A.L.R. 856 (C.C.A. 4th, 1934); Cor-
ral v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation. 42 Ariz. 213, 23 P.(2d) 934
(1933); Union Iron Works v. Industrial Ace Commission of California, 190
Cal. 33, 210 P. 410 (1922); Faber v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185
N.E. 255 (1933); Richards v. Rogers Boiler and Burner Co., 252 Mich. 52, 234
N.W. 428 (1928).
13. Hall v. City of Shreveport, 157 La. 589, 102 So. 680 (1925); Barr v.
Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 183 La. 1013, 165 So. 185 (1935); Kroncke v. Caddo
Parish School Board, 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938); 'Brownfleld v. Southern
Amusement Co., 196 La. 73, 198 So. 656 (1940); Puchner v. Employers' Lia-
bility Assur. Corporation, 198 La. 921, 5 So.(2d) 288 (1941).
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same time provides for the employer a liability which is limited
and determinate. Article 2315 provides a right of action com-
patible with the theory of heirship' and not merely to depend-
ents; but it is only a right to damages for wrongful conduct. It is
submitted that the Employers' Liability Act is an entirely differ-
ent and improved type of remedy, designed to protect. a certain
class of persons-persons who might become public charges with-
out the aid of the employer. It is for these people that the legis-
lature provided compensation irrespective of fault on the part of
the employee, leaving untouched the rights of heirs not depend-
ents.
Suppose in the present case the deceased had lived several
months. By the provisions of Article 2315 he would be entitled to
daraages for suffering from scalds and burns resulting from the
employer's negligence. Such an action does not abate with the
death of the employee, but is transmitted to certain designated
heirs, among whom are brothers and sisters.15 Under the Em-
ployers' Liability Act the employee would be entitled to a fixed
rate of compensation for disability caused by the accident, 16 or
in case of his death, his dependents would be entitled to compen-
sation." In return for the improved remedy afforded them by the
compensation act, the employee and his dependents must give up
all other rights on account of such injury. Yet, the effect of the
Atchison case is to disregard Article 2315 entirely, and substitute
therefor the remedy provided by the compensation act-to allow
compensation only to dependents.
In a period of war, when oftentimes all members of families
are engaged in defense employment, it seems there might be
many cases arising under the compensation law where there
would be no dependents. It appears to the writer that the Atchi-
son case creates an embarrassing situation, where the employer
14. Art. 945, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. In the early case of Chivers v. Roger, 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898),
the court pointed out that although an action for damages was personal, and
personal actions do not survive the death of the beneficiary, in view of
Article 2315, this right exists in favor of certain designated heirs after the
death of the beneficiary. But the court did not allow an action by the broth-
ers and sisters of the deceased because they were not designated in the code
as heirs to whom the deceased's right was transmitted. However, the effect
of this decision has been abrogated by various amendments to Article 2315
which have provided for the survival of the deceased's right of action in
favor of certain designated surviving beneficiaries, among whom are included
brothers and sisters.
16. La. Act 20 of 1914, §§ 1-2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4392].
17. Id. at § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4398).
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is allowed to go "scot free" after failing to provide a safe work-
ing place for his employees. To abolish the employer's liability
under Article 2315 where there are no dependents is to give him
protection for which he does not pay. An unbroken line of de-
cisions interprets the Employers' Liability Act liberally to favor
the employee; the present decision interprets it literally to the
detriment of his estate. If this is to be the jurisprudence of the
court, it is a matter for legislative attention.
J.J.C.
